A real-time knowledge-based network intrusion-detection model for a link-state routing protocol is presented for the OSPF protocol. This model includes three layers: a data process layer to parse packets and dispatch data; an event abstractor to abstract predefined real-time events for the link-state routing protocol; and an extended timed finite state machine to express the real-time behavior of the protocol engine and to detect intrusions by pattern matching. The timed FSM, called the JiNao Finite State Machine (JFSM) is extended from the conventional FSM with timed states, multiple timers, and time constraints on state transitions. The JFSM is implemented as a generator that can create any FSM by constructing the configuration file only. The results show that this approach is very effective for detecting real-time intrusions. Our approach can be extended for use in other network protocol intrusion-detection systems, especially for those with known attacks.
INTRODUCTION
In today's Internet, routing protocols (e.g., RIPv2, EIGRP, BGP, and OSPFv2) form the heart of the network infrastructure. Until recently, the security of these protocols was not fully emphasized. However, there is a growing awareness of the potential consequences of attacks aimed at the infrastructure, particularly at the routing protocols Wu et al. 1997; Wang et al. 1998; Bradley et al. 1998; .
Two classes of routing protocols are used on the current Internet: distance-vector and link-state. Link-state routing is considered to have more advanced features than distance-vector protocols in many ways [Huitema 1995; Hauser et al. 1997] . In this article we are only concerned about link-state routing protocols. In link-state routing, every node keeps a "map" of the entire network, which is used to compute shortest paths to all destinations. Each node contributes to this global view by periodically distributing (via flooding) link-state update (LSU) packets. An LSU contains one or more LSAs (link state advertisements) that reflect the current status of all the incident links of a given node. That is, a router will periodically announce to the whole world its relationship with all of its neighbors.
Intrusion-Detection System
Building and maintaining a perfectly secure system, if not impossible, is both technically difficult and economically costly. Hence, intrusion-detection systems (IDS) are used to detect and call attention to odd and suspicious behavior. In 1987, Denning [1987] proposed an intrusion-detection model based on the hypothesis that security violations can be detected by monitoring a system's audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage. Since her work, many IDS prototypes have been created. Several surveys have been published [Mukherjee et al. 1994; Frank 1994; Cannady and Harrell 1996] , and a partial bibliography of current IDS can be found in Sobirey [1997] . A good IDS taxonomy is presented in Debar et al. [1998] .
Current approaches to intrusion detection can be broadly classified into two trends. Anomaly-detection systems, or so-called behavior-based IDSs, and misuse-detection systems, or so-called knowledge-based IDSs. Behaviorbased intrusion-detection systems monitor and build a reference profile of the normal behavior of the information system by using statistical methods and try to detect activity that deviates from this normal behavior profile [Denning 1987; Javitz and Valdest 1991; Anderson et al. 1995; D'haeseleer et al. 1996] . Anything that does not correspond to a previously learned behavior is considered anomalous and perhaps intrusive. The main advantage of this approach is that it can detect attempts to exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities without a priori knowledge of the security flaws of the target system. That is, it could automatically discover new potential attacks.
However, a behavior-based IDS often suffers a high false positive rate because the entire scope of the system behavior may not be covered during the learning phase-and legitimate behaviors may change over time. Another weakness is the requirement of a (sometimes long) training period and the assumption that the system is free of anomaly during this training period. For example, the information system may be under attack while the IDS is learning the subject behavior. As such, the behavior profile may contain intrusive events and result in future false negatives.
Knowledge-based IDSs accumulate knowledge about attacks, examine traffic, and try to identify patterns indicating that dangerous or suspicious activity is occurring. This approach can be applied against known attack patterns only, and needs to update the knowledge base frequently. An example of such an approach is a virus checker. Any action that is not explicitly recognized as an attack is considered acceptable. A majority of break-ins or intrusions result from known but unpatched vulnerabilities, as evidenced by reports from Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University. Hence, knowledge-based IDSs are attractive, especially in commercial products, due to their low false alarm rates and high accuracy. Several techniques have been proposed in knowledge-based IDS, including expert systems, model-based reasoning intrusion detection [Garvey and Lunt 1991] , state transition analysis [Ilgun et al. 1995] , keystroke monitoring, and colored Petri nets [Kumar and Spafford 1994] .
JiNao Intrusion-Detection System
None of the intrusion-detection approaches described above are sufficient to catch all intrusions by themselves. It is recognized that a successful intrusion-detection system should incorporate several different but complementary approaches. The JiNao project undertaken at MCNC/NCSU employs a comprehensive approach to prevent attacks and detect intrusions.
The JiNao architecture is shown in Figure 1 . The prevention module, with its administrative rule checking (like a firewall), detects events that are in clear violation of some security policy. The detection module combines both anomaly-based statistical analysis and knowledge-based protocol analysis. The statistical analysis module is able to detect any intrusions that have significant impact on certain statistical profiles of the system behavior. The protocol analysis module can detect known attacks with relatively low latency. It also provides additional information for source identification of the intrusions and some security guidelines for the prevention module to adjust its administrative rules. This article focuses on the protocol analysis module in detail. For details of other system components, please see Jou et al. [1997] .
Network faults or malicious attacks typically result in a number of timing events. In the JiNao protocol analysis module (JPAM), we are interested in correlating these ordered events to determine whether the protocol's behavior is normal or abnormal. This problem, referred to as "event-correlation," is a fundamental issue in many network security and fault-tolerant systems. JPAM applied and extended the finite state machine model [Hopcroft and Ullman 1979] to capture both good and bad behaviors of a link-state routing protocol engine. The extended FSM model, which will be discussed later, is called JFSM (JiNao finite state machine). It has been defined and implemented to make the FSM model more expressive in dealing with the timing issue in routing protocol operations.
As presented later, the results show that this methodology is effective in detecting some real-time routing protocol attacks. Additionally, the system described here may serve as the basis for an extended study of real-time intrusion-detection modeling for other network protocols.
LINK-STATE ROUTING PROTOCOLS AND AUTONOMOUS OSPF ROUTING
Routing protocols are used by routers to create a map of the network, so that the routers can determine how to forward packets from one point to another. Link-state routing protocols create the map in three distinct phases. First, each router meets its neighbors and learns about its local neighborhood. Second, routers share that information with all other routers on the network by exchanging information. During this phase, a router learns about neighborhoods other than its local one. Finally, each router combines the information about each individual neighbor to get a "map" of the entire network by applying routing algorithms to come up with routing tables. OSPF (open shortest path first) [Moy 1998a ], based on link-state and SPF (shortest path first) technology, is classified as an interior gateway protocol (IGP) . This means that it distributes routing information between routers belonging to a single autonomous system (AS) where a collection of computer systems, routers, and other network devices is under one administrative domain.
The three stages of OSPF are as follows,
(1) Meeting the neighbors The first step is the creation of adjacencies. A hello protocol is defined to establish and maintain the neighbor relationship. That is, every OSPF router periodically sends hello packets to discover its neighboring routers. Three components in the hello packet header keep information about the status of routers. The hello interval indicates how frequently the sender should retransmit its hello packets; the router dead interval tells how long it takes to declare a router unavailable, and a list describes the neighbors that the sender has already met. Once neighboring routers have "met" via the hello protocol, they go through a "database exchange process" to synchronize their databases.
(2) Share the information by flooding LSA In the second step, the information about a router's local neighborhood is assembled into a link-state advertisement (LSA), and is broadcast (via a reliable intelligent flooding scheme) to all other routers. The combined information makes up the link state (LS) database for the network. In a broadcasting network like Ethernet, a designated router may be elected to advertise for the whole network.
(3) Calculate shortest routes based on LS database Once all systems have an up-to-date link state (LS) database, each router can use the Dijkstra algorithm to calculate a shortest-path tree with the router itself as the root node and then form a complete picture of routing in the network.
In a dynamic network, routers may restart, network cost metrics may change, and links may fail. These three phases of the OSPF operation ensure a functional routing environment.
Different from RIP, and many other routing protocols, the OSPF protocol does not use UDP or TCP. It runs directly over IP, using IP protocol 89. IP fragmentation and reassembly are used when fragmentation is necessary. There are five types of OSPF packets. The hello packet is used by a router to discover its neighbors. The database description and the link state request packets are used to synchronize two routers' databases when an adjacency is being initialized. The link state update packets are used to update link state database. The link state acknowledgment packets ensure a reliable transmission by acknowledging flooded LSU packets.
Link-State Advertisement (LSA)
Once a router meets its neighbors by exchanging hello packets, it distributes that information to the rest of the network. To do this, it floods an LSA throughout the network. All LSAs share a generic header, which is shown in Figure 2. 2.1.1 LSA Format. The first 16 bits store an LSA's age. The age starts at zero and is incremented on every hop of the flooding procedure. LSAs are also aged as they are held in each router's database. When an LSA's age reaches 3,600 seconds (MaxAge), it is considered out of date and should be purged from a router's database. The option field indicates which optional capabilities are associated with an LSA.
There are five types of LSAs (router, network, two types of summary, and AS-external LSAs; see Moy [1998a] ). The LS type field dictates the format and function of an LSA. The link state ID field identifies the piece of the routing domain that is being described by the LSA. The advertising router ID field specifies the OSPF router ID of an LSA's originator. This 32-bit number uniquely identifies each router within an AS. It can be assigned to one of the routers' IP addresses. An LSA is uniquely identified by LS type, link state ID, and advertising router ID.
The LS sequence number field is a signed 32-bit integer. It is used to detect old or duplicate LSAs. It starts at 0x80000001 (0x80000000 is reserved by OSPF), and is incremented each time a router originates a new instance of the LSA. When an attempt is made to increment the sequence number past the maximum value (i.e., 0x7fffffff), the LSA must first be flushed from the routing domain. This is done by prematurely aging that LSA (with maximum sequence number) to MaxAge and then flooding it. As soon as this flooding is acknowledged by all adjacent neighbors, a new instance can be originated with sequence number 0x80000001. The LS checksum field contains the checksum of the complete contents of the LSA, except the LS age field. The LS age field is excluded so that an LSA's age can be incremented without updating the checksum.
Here a distinction must be made between an LSA and an LSA instance. An LSA is associated with a particular link or network. For example, there is a link connecting routers A and B. Router A is responsible for originating an LSA to tell other routers that it has a link to router B, while router B will use another LSA to tell others that it has a link to router A. An LSA instance gives the state of a particular LSA at a particular time. For example, router A at time t 1 may broadcast an LSA instance saying that the cost for its link to router B is 10. After a while, say at time t 2 , the status of the link changes. Router A should broadcast a new LSA instance stating the new cost for this link. In a network, there may exist more than one instance for a particular LSA. An interesting issue here is the "fight back" phenomenon in a link-state routing information exchange. Assume an intruder injects a bad LSA into a routing domain to impersonate a good router. The other routers will compare the bad LSA with the good one in their databases. If the bad LSA is older, it will be discarded without causing any harm. Otherwise, the good LSA will be replaced with the bad LSA in the database. The bad LSA will in turn be forwarded to all the neighbors (except the one from which the router received the bad LSA). So the bad LSA will be spread all over the routing domain. Eventually, this LSA's legal originator (victim) will receive this bad LSA. In response, the originator of this LSA will increase the sequence number, reset the age, and broadcast a new instance of this LSA back into the network. This "fight back" phenomenon will continue forcing the attacker to keep repeating the attack.
Several OSPF protocol parameters have fixed architectural values. Table  I gives some rules and constants related to LSA behavior, according to the Real-Time Protocol Analysis
• OSPF standard [Moy 1998a; 1998b] . HelloInterval and RouterDeadInterval are two configurable protocol parameters.
Fault-Tolerant Properties of the OSPF Protocol
In general, protocols can be made fault tolerant by three "standard" techniques [Gouda 1993] : appending sequence numbers to messages, discarding received erroneous messages, and timing out. Sequence numbers can be used to detect and correct all occurrences of message reordering. Checksums can be used to verify the integrity of a message. Timeouts can be used to detect and correct occurrences of message loss. OSPF uses the hello protocol to maintain "aliveness" information and the "age" to provide "freshness" information. Through the combination of the "age" and "sequence number," OSPF posseses a fault-tolerant property called "self-stabilization," where a system can automatically recover from arbitrary transient faults in a bounded period of time without any external intervention [Dijkstra 1974 ]. This property forces attacks to be persistent in order to be successful. Recently, self-stabilization has become an important issue for fault-tolerant distributed systems. Surveys and papers can be found in Shukla [2001] and Herman [2001] .
Through flooding and LS database synchronization, OSPF can have topology-independent detectability. That is, the router can observe all the LSAs' behavior in the same area, even from other originating routers. This property helps the IDSs to sit in only one location and detect a whole area's intrusion status to some degree of approximation.
Although OSPF is considered a more secure routing protocol, several vulnerabilities have been found owing to implementation flaws . The exploitation of these vulnerabilities is presented in the next section.
OSPF ATTACKS: MECHANISM AND IMPLEMENTATION

Attack Implementation on FreeBSD
In order to validate the proposed approach, three OSPF insider attacks were implemented for the FreeBSD platform . FreeBSD provides a mechanism called divert socket, which can be used to intercept OSPF packets from the kernel and divert them to a user process. The attacks themselves are implemented in that user process, and the tampered with OSPF packets are then reinjected into the kernel, which will deliver these packets to either the routing daemon running on the same machine (incoming direction) or its neighbors (outgoing direction). The architecture of the attack implementation is depicted in Figure 3 .
Attack 1: Seqϩϩ Attack -A Simple Modification
When the attacker receives an LSA instance, it can modify the link state metric and increase the LSA sequence number by 1 (i.e., Seqϩϩ). The attacker also needs to recompute both the LSA and OSPF checksums before the tampered LSA is reinjected into the system. Because the attacked LSA has an increased sequence number, it will be considered "fresher" by other routers. Eventually it will be propagated to the originator of this particular LSA. The originator, according to the OSPFv2 specification, will "fight back" with a new LSA carrying correct link status information and an even fresher sequence number.
This attack causes an unstable network topology if the attacker keeps generating "Seqϩϩ" LSAs. For example, all routers at one point will think the link cost is infinity (the link is down), but then the fight-back LSA from the originator will tell them the cost metric is much smaller (e.g., 2).
Attack 2: Maximum Age
When the attacker receives an LSA instance, it can modify the LSA age to MaxAge (i.e., 1 hour), and reinject it into the system. The attacked LSA, with its untouched sequence number and corrupted maximum age, will cause all routers to purge the corresponding LSA from their topology databases. Eventually, the originator of this purged LSA will also receive the MaxAge LSA. The originator, according to the OSPFv2 specification, 
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• will "fight back" with a new LSA carrying correct link status information and a fresher sequence number.
This attack also causes an unstable network topology if the attacker keeps generating "MaxAge" LSAs. For example, all routers at one point will think the link is not available, but then the fight-back LSA from the originator will tell them the link is actually there.
Attack 3: Maximum Sequence Number
When the attacker receives an LSA instance, it can modify the link state metric and set the LSA sequence number to 0x7FFFFFFF (i.e., MaxSequenceNumber). The attacker also needs to recompute both the LSA and OSPF checksums before the tampered LSA is reinjected into the system. Because the attacked LSA has the maximum LSA sequence number, it will be considered the "freshest" by other routers. Eventually it will be propagated to the originator of this particular LSA. The originator, according to the OSPFv2 specification, "should" first purge the LSA (setting MaxAge) and then flood a new LSA carrying correct link status information and the smallest sequence number: 0x80000001.
The effect of this attack depends on the particular implementation of the OSPF protocol. If the protocol is indeed implemented correctly, then the effect is similar to Seqϩϩ. On the other hand, many routers do not implement the MaxSeq LSA handling correctly: purging the MaxSeq LSA is not implemented. This implies that the MaxSeq LSA will stay in every router's topology database for one hour before it reaches its MaxAge. In other words, the attacker can disturb routing stability for up to one hour.
JINAO REAL-TTME PROTOCOL ANALYSIS MODULE (JPAM)
A behavior-based IDS, such as the statistical module in the JiNao project, suffers from many false alarms and a longer learning period. The JiNao protocol analysis module (JPAM), which is a knowledge-based IDS, was designed to overcome these deficiencies and to complement the JiNao statistical module.
The idea behind JPAM is that malicious attacks or faults often result in a set of possible alarm event sequences of some special events, which can be described as input strings to the finite state machine. Good behaviors as well as known behaviors are often "predictable" (there are several attacks we are already aware of). We can identify the current behavior as good or bad based on the protocol specification and according to the order of packet events. In general, we observe the sequence of events to determine what kind of attacks occur or the status of the router's behavior. Figure 4 shows a conceptual view of our approach. The upper part represents how the model of normal behavior and known intrusion patterns could be created offline. The online detection process of the lower part relies on the assumption that when an attack exploits vulnerabilities in the system, either a new sequence of events that deviate from the normal event sequence will appear or some known intrusive pattern will be matched. The protocol analysis machine (PAM) obtains the network packet from the interception module, filtering the packet to eliminate irrelevant packets that are not related to the protocol we monitor, and then dispatches the packets to the event abstractor (EvtAbs). EvtAbs basically does the translation job to abstract the predefined event from a given packet. Based on the sequence of events it observed, the pattern extraction (PatExt) will record the patterns into the IDS database. This can be used as a reference for constructing FSM by the system security officer for online intrusion detection. After constructing the FSMs, each of them can do the pattern matching for different known attacks simultaneously and output the alarm information when a possible intrusion is detected.
Pattern matching in intrusion detection must be done with the "follows" semantics rather than the "immediately follows" semantics [Kumar and Spafford 1994] . That is, any two adjacent subpatterns within a pattern could be separated implicitly by an arbitrary number (possibly zero) of events of any type (i.e., ".*" in Unix regular expression syntax). For example, pattern "ab" specifies that event "a" is followed by event "b" with some (or none) intervening events ("a.*b"). In other words, JFSM was designed to detect pattern "ab" not only from "bcabaa" but also from "acecbcca".
Many attacks come with timed properties; for instance, in order to successfully attack a special sequence, "abcd" must be finished within 10 minutes but the "bc" subsequence cannot be performed before 2 minutes elapses (i.e., "bc" cannot happen too soon), since this may violate some protocol rule. Without these timing constraints, this attack will fail. Since JFSM is extended with a timed automata, it is able to deal with the real-time information related to these kinds of attacks. Another complication arises because there could be multiple intrusion patterns interleaved 
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• in a long event sequence string. For example, if "ab" and "adc" are two known attack patterns of event sequences, there could be a sequence "bcaecdebce" containing these mixed attack patterns. As shown in Figure  5 , JPAM was designed to be able to detect all of them at the same time.
In terms of detectability, although its completeness depends on the regular update of knowledge about attacks, JPAM uses signatures and the FSM approach which allows a precise representation of the attack patterns. This makes it easier for security officers dynamically tuning the IDS to take preventive or corrective action. In terms of accuracy, JPAM has a potentially very low false alarm rate, and thus is an attractive approach to many applications.
Overview of the JPAM Architecture
JPAM uses routing traffic and knowledge about the protocol engine to detect when an intruder is attempting an attack. When the JPAM detects such an attack, it sends an alarm message to the local decision module describing the attack and containing the sequence of messages (events) used to determine that the attack took place.
The generic architecture of JPAM can be described as having the following three basic abstractions shown in Figure 6 : Data process layer. This layer, getting packets from the interception module, provides a low-level data interface to monitor network packets. It contains packet parsers which can translate each packet to correct protocol data structures. Based on the protocol-dependent input packet, this layer dispatches each output in a protocol-dependent format-for instance, the packet header, with a timestamp to the corresponding event machine for abstracting events.
Event abstraction layer. This layer provides the representation of events and generates the general domain of the inputs for the JFSM. It contains a universal event generator which can generate the event abstractor machines for different protocols based on different configuration files. All event definitions are put into these files so that dynamic adjustment is possible. Each event machine may generate a different sequence of Attack with "Timing" properties:
"abcd" must finished with 10 minutes but "bc"cannot be done more more quickly than 2 minutes... events based on the system data or network packets provided by the lower data information layer.
JFSM pattern-matching layer. This layer detects the matching patterns based on the sequence of events or signatures from its corresponding event machine. It contains a JFSM generator to generate different finite state machines based on different configuration files.
This abstraction provides the ability to adapt alternative solutions to each layer without changing the interfaces between the layers of this model. The JPAM maintains a collection of event abstractors for each protocol JiNao is capable of monitoring. Each event abstractor can have several JFSMs to detect multiple intrusion patterns at the same time. Each JFSM is used to detect either one kind of intrusion or the good, expected behavior. Each JFSM could be constructed offline and stored in a humanreadable file. The main benefits of this model are its extensibility, portability, and flexibility through dynamic reconfiguration. The generic JFSM generator can create any FSM on the basis of the transition table in its configuration file. By dynamically changing the configuration files of event abstractors and JFSMs, this model could potentially be applied to other systems or even different mixed protocols.
The architecture for the current implementation of the JiNao protocol analysis module for OSPF/LSA is described in Figure 7 . The upper part, "Protocol Analysis Machine (PAM)" can be specified by a configuration file that contains all the information about the construction of "Event Abstractors (EvtAbs)" and "JFSMs." The file indicates which LSAs are relevant to this module and which JFSMs are used for analyzing each LSA's behavior.
Each EvtAbs is responsible for one particular type of LSA and has several JFSMs to simultaneously analyze the LSA's events. Every JFSM is associated with a configuration file that contains all of the states and Conceptually, when an OSPF packet comes from the interception module, the PAM records the timestamp of the local machine time and dispatches each LSA to the appropriate EvtAbs. When an EvtAbs gets the LSA, it first analyzes three fields-LS-checksum, LS-age, and LS-seq-to determine if the predefined events "InvalidLSA," "MaxAgeRefreshLSA," or "MaxSeqLSA" occur. It will then check for the "BigJumpSeqLSA" event. If none of these events occur, EvtAbs will regard this as a normal LSA update and input the "UpdateLSA" event to JFSMs. Otherwise, it sends the corresponding event to its JFSMs and then continues to process the next low-level LSA from PAM.
There could be a basic JFSM for good or normal behavior, and other JFSMs for each known attack pattern. JPAM tries to catch the attack through the use of historical patterns. The FSMs will work collectively to determine the actual status of the routers' behavior and detect the intrusion occurrence accurately. Starting from an initial state, each JFSM will record a "currentState" variable and decide to which state it will advance based on the event string it received and the transition table in its configuration file. If a known attack happens, at least one of the JFSMs should raise an alarm and report to the higher decision module or security management module which, in turn, will decide on the appropriate action for this attack. If the JFSM cannot handle the input event from the current state, it will send out a message indicating the execution status of the JFSM. If all the JFSMs fail, JPAM will conclude an unknown attack pattern occurred and report the entire input event sequence of this possible attack.
JiNao Event Abstractor for OSPF LSA Analysis
In order to catch events from OSPF packets, some abstract events were predefined for a value change in several fields of the LSA header on the basis of the protocol specification, as shown in Table II . Each event is timestamped such that we can identify the order of the events and the duration between events. There were two categories of events in our implementation: incoming events (i_events) from other neighbor routers and outgoing events (o_events) from the router itself. For demonstration purposes here, parenthesized entries represent the group events. Each group has both incoming and outgoing types. The JFSM model is a variant of the Timed I/O Automata [Lynch and Tuttle 1989] . For each incoming and outgoing LSA, we save the current and previous values as variables: i_prevLSA, i_currentLSA, o_prevLSA, and o_currentLSA, such that comparison and analysis between them can be made. This kind of hierarchical event abstraction and category could make the intrusion sensitivity adjustable when setting up the JFSM.
We assume that event sequences of good behavior and bad behavior are distinguishable. In other words, if s 0 s 1 s 2 ...s n is defined as a bad sequence, then there is no other correct operation with the same sequence. The JiNao finite state machines could be built based on good behavior according to the OSPF standard. In our implementation, each known attack pattern was modeled in a finite state machine. Normally, routers should behave correctly by the OSPF protocol specification and issue the updated LSA each "LSRefreshTime"(default 30 minutes). The correct behaviors should comply with the rules listed in Table I . The event sequences resulting from the bad behaviors are abnormal, and should not occur based on correct protocol implementation. The most probable reasons for observing these bad behaviors are an incoming attack, a software implementation bug, or a router system fault.
The event abstractor should produce all the events that form the input domain of the JFSM, and the JFSM does the pattern matching by processing its state transitions. This article provides only the related concepts in the JFSM components. More details on automata theory can be found in Hopcroft and Ullman [1979] ; Lynch and Tuttle [1989] , and timed automata for real-time systems can be found in Shankar [1994] ; Alur and Dill [1994] ;
Real-Time Protocol Analysis • and Lynch [1996] . A general framework and algorithms to solve the alarm correlation problem on the basis of a probabilistic finite state machine were also proposed in Rouvellou and Hart [1995] . i_HelloClockTick An event occurs when router receives any incoming hello packet which is at least 1 second later then previous hello packet.
Reset
An internal event always forces system back to its initial state.
16
• H.-Y. Chang et al.
JINAO FINITE STATE MACHINE
One of the chief goals of the JiNao project is to provide extensibility; that is, it should be easy to adjust an IDS to the types of intrusions that are tracked. This requirement has the following implications for the JPAM.
(1) The JPAM should be reconfigurable at runtime. In particular, users should be able to add (and remove) JFSMs as new types of intrusions become problematical and old types cease to be.
(2) Adding JFSMs should not require recompilations of the JPAM.
To accommodate these concerns, we use a table-driven implementation of FSMs together with a generic driver routine. A new JFSM is added by simply defining a table for it in a file and then loading it by reading this file into the JPAM. The driver routine (which will be compiled into the JPAM) would then handle the "execution" of the JFSM. Moreover, for modeling temporal relations among events, timing information is introduced into the JFSM's state transition diagram. A state transition will depend not only on the event identity itself but also on the time at which the event occurs. This section describes each of these concepts in turn.
JiNao Real-Time FSM Specification
The basic concept of an FSM [Hopcroft and Ullman 1979] is simple: the machine contains a specific number of distinct internal states one of which represents the possible active state. A finite set of input symbols is mapped to a finite set of output symbols by each state; an input symbol is given to the FSM, which returns an output symbol before making a possible transition to a new state.
In realtime modeling, a timed automaton accepts timed words; that is, each of these timed words is associated with an occurrence time. The most common way to introduce timing information in a process model is by associating lower and upper bounds with transitions; examples include timed Petri nets [Wang 1998 ]; timed I/O automata [Lynch 1996 ]; and timed transition systems and a timed assertional proof system [Shankar 1992 ]. The timed assertional proof system also shows a simple proof system just by introducing state variables of the last event occurrence time and the event deadline time, but does not use a "current time" variable as the other models do. Realtime properties are stated using traditional assertions based on temporal logic.
Most of these systems deal with the "discrete-time model" instead of "continuous dense-time model." Alur and Dill [1994] and Alur [1998] proposed a timed finite automata to annotate state-transition graphs with time constraints using a finite number of real-valued clocks for the densetime model. Unlike other approaches, a bound on time to traverse a path in the automaton, not just the time interval between successive transitions, can be expressed directly.
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• The JiNao real-time FSM (JFSM) model is a variant of the timed automota model [Alur 1998 ] by associating each real-time state with two time variables, T in and T last , and associating each real-time transition with a conditional guard with time constraints. The T in of each state indicates the time when the JFSM enters this state, and the T last of each state indicates when the very last transition happens in this state. T current is used in the JFSM to record the current event time. With this design, the JFSM can easily inspect different time constraints between states and between transitions to comply with the protocol specification.
Definition 5.1 (JFSM M).
A JFSM (JiNao finite state machine), M J , consists of 8 tuples:
where Q is a finite set of real-time states, ⌺ is the alphabet of events or input symbols, ␦ ʚ Q ϫ ⌺ ϫ Q is the transition function mapping Q ϫ ⌺ to Q. That is, ␦͑q, a͒ is a real-time state for each real-time state q, and input symbol a. q 0 ʕ Q is the set of real-time initial states and F ʕ Q is the set of real-time final states. Furthermore, the construct of M J also contains three more components related to intrusion detection: string FSMid to identify M J , ReportInfo to represent the message that will be sent out when an intrusion is detected (i.e., when it reaches a critical transition), and a queue EffExtQue for recording the effective execution.
Definition 5.2 (JFSM input events). The input event e i is a 2-tuple:
where etime is the timestamp for the occurrence of e i , and ename is the event identity as defined in Table II. We did not differentiate the "input" and "output" actions as in an I/O automata [Lynch and Tuttle 1989] . However, in our implementation, the prefixes i_ and o_ of ename are used to identify whether it is an "outgoing" or "incoming" LSA event. Furthermore, events can be sorted in partial order by the values of their etime fields, which are locally timestamped.
Definition 5.3 (Real-time timer function). A real-time timer t i is a 2-tuple:
where val ʦ N ϩ represents the value of t i ; and is the timer function, : N ϩ 3 N ϩ , which indicates how to calculate the timer value val.
Because the JFSM deals with the discrete event model, the time space here is in the integer-valued space. Of course, in physical processes, events do not always happen at integer-valued times, and continuous time must be approximated by choosing some fixed quantum. This could limit the accuracy with which physical systems can be modeled [Alur and Dill 1994] ; however, this model could be extended to the continuous time space (i.e., R ϩ -valued) without too many modifications. Furthermore, the timed JFSM is event-driven, so a global variable T current is kept updated to the newest event time whenever an event happens. In our current implementation, three timers T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 were calculated by the functions
Definition 5.4 (Real-time state of JFSM). Each real-time state RtS s in the JFSM is a 5-tuple:
where T current is the current JFSM time; RtS init is the initial state; RtS s is the current state; T 1 is the elapsed time from the very last event (i.e., the event interarrival time) in the current state; T 2 is the elapsed time since entering this state; and T 3 is the elapsed time since this pattern began from the initial state.
Whenever an input event occurs, the JFSM takes that input and checks to see if there is a transition available for handling this input and determines whether it can advance to the next state or not. Transitions in the JFSM can be conditional, that is, one input event may have more than one transition that can handle it. The JFSM will process the first one that satisfies the given conditions (e.g., time constraints).
Definition 5.5 (Conditional transition).
A conditional transition is a 5-tuple:
where RtS from is the "from" state in this transition; e in is the input event that triggers this transition, ␥ is the output result accompanied by this transition; RtS to is the "to" state after this transition; Cond i is a condition or guard for this transition. When an input event occurs, only if the condition Cond i is true can the JFSM execute this transition to advance itself from state RtS from to the next state RtS to .
Condition Cond i can be represented in a complex way by using a temporal logic language. The set of JFSM transitions is one kind of conditional transition that only considers the conditions related to time constraints (e.g., several timeouts in a protocol) with simple semantics to describe it. When a transition i is available in the current state, the current input event e current happens such that e current ϭ i .e in , and all of the conditions are valid. That is, all of the time constraints on this transition are satisfied in this state at this specific time. RtT i ϭ ͑RtS from , e in , ␥, RtS to , ⌰͒, where RtS from is the "from" state; e in can be either a real input event triggering RtT i or a special NUL event; e , ␥ is the output result; RtS to is the "to" state; and ⌰ is the set of timer constraints for the transition RtT i .
Three timers, T1, T2, and T3, are in the current JFSM. T1 is used to count the interarrival time between current and previous events. This ensures that, in the same state, transitions must not happen either too soon or too late. 1 ϭ ͑T1 min ͒, T1 max represents lower and upper bounds (integers in seconds) for the value of T1 ϭ ͑T current Ϫ RtS from .T last ͒; and 2 ϭ ͑T2 min ͒, T2 max represents the lower and upper bounds, respectively for T2 ϭ ͑T current Ϫ RtS from .T in ͒ (integers in seconds). In other words, in order for transition RtT i to occur, the time that the JFSM spent in RtS from must be higher than T2 min and lower than T2 max . Furthermore, T3 ϭ ͑T current Ϫ RtS init .T last ͒ could specify that the whole pattern must happen within the constraint 3 ϭ ͑T3 min ͒, T3 max .
For simplicity, we represent each transition as a 10-tuple:
This representation is used in the remainder of this document. Note that in our approach, the JFSM time constraints are associated with transitions, and timers are associated with each state. There is a unified clock in the entire JFSM, but there could be several timers in each state. It is not necessary to reset timers, since they will be updated while still in the current state. Furthermore, a transition RtT i is effective if RtT i .RtS from RtT i .RtS to . That is, it can change the JFSM into a different state. If the pair value of (Ti min , Ti max ) is ͑0, ϱ͒, then the timer T i does not matter, and the JFSM will just ignore it.
We can have two different transitions in theJFSM, from the same state on the same input event. For example, as shown in Figure 9 , we have:
RtT 1 ϭ ͑RtS alice , e Hello , ␥ 1 , RtS chris , 0, ϱ, 0, 10, 0, ϱ͒, and RtT 2 ϭ ͑RtS alice , e Hello , ␥ 2 , RtS bob , 0, ϱ, 11, ϱ, 0, ϱ͒.
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• Here, we do not care about the frequency of two successive event transitions and the total elapsed time since the pattern began from the initial state. We only consider the time elapsed in the current state, RtS alice . If the e Hello event occurs less than 11 seconds after the JFSM entered RtS alice , then RtT 1 will happen and the JFSM will advance to RtS chris . Otherwise, an effective transition RtT 2 will be triggered and the JFSM will enter RtS bob .
The following special case represents an effective transition in which if no real events occur, the JFSM will only remain in RtS alice for at most 30 seconds and then advance to state RtS timeout .
RtT 3 ϭ ͑RtS alice , e , ␥ 3 , RtS timeout , 0, ϱ, 31, ϱ, 0, ϱ͒.
The JFSM uses a event-driven time system, that is, the local time is updated to the newest event time whenever an event happens. In case no event occurs within a period of time, we assume that there is a never-stop clock engine regularly generating e tick every short (finite) period. This period is not necessarily a fixed interval because of the discrete eventdriven property. For instance, e tick could be the HelloClockTick event in OSPF.
If no transition is available for current events, an internal transition will trigger the system to a special fail state RtS fail and output this new sequence of events from the initial state as well. This situation occurs when the JFSM finds a new pattern that it cannot handle. This sequence of events, serving as a new learned pattern, can be added to the knowledge base. The JPAM can either create or enhance a JFSM to handle this new pattern. In the RtS fail state, the JFSM will automatically reset itself to the initial state such that it can continue monitoring for other intrusions. To eliminate unwanted event transitions, the JFSM can use a wildcard "*Ϫ" to represent all other events, except those in the available transitions. For example, RtT 4 ϭ ͑RtS alice , * Ϫ , ␥ 4 , RtS alice , 0, ϱ, 0, 30, 0, ϱ͒ represents the situation where if any event occurs that does not match the other available transitions (RtT i , i ϭ 1, 2, 3) and T 2 is less than 30 seconds, then the JFSM will stay in RtS alice . For reducing false alarms and monitoring continuous intrusions, a special "reset state" can also be used. If a state name has a "_RESET_" suffix, this state is considered to be a "reset state," which will immediately reset to the initial state automatically once the JFSM reaches the reset state. For example, "N_RESET_" could represent the "Normal RESET" in which the JFSM performs a valid reset, while "A_RESET_" represents the "Alarm RESET" in which the JFSM has detected an attack and restarts itself to the initial state to keep monitoring future intrusions.
Definition 5.8 (Critical transition of a JFSM).
A critical transition Ct i is the transition with which the JFSM should print a warning message and report the related information to some responsible module. This critical transition is used, for instance, when the JFSM detects an intrusion pattern; it should trigger M J to report a detection message containing FSMid, ReportInfo and EffExtQue to the decision module.
For example, if ͑ 1 , 2 , 3 , ..., n ͒ is the sequence of transitions in the JFSM for a specific intrusion pattern, the last transition, n , should be defined as a critical transition.
The JFSM with all the transitions is configured by a special configuration file. A critical transition can also be defined by a format in which its output string has a prefix ‫ف'‬ '. An example of a JFSM specification for OSPF/LSA intrusion detection is shown in Appendix A.2. The algorithm for the transition function of the JFSM can be found in Appendix A.1.
Definition 5.9 (Execution of a JFSM).
An execution fragment for a JFSM M is a finite or infinite sequence RtS 0 , RtT 1 , RtS 1 , RtT 2 , RtS 3 , . . . of alternating states and transitions. An execution is an execution fragment beginning with a start state.
Given an input string, the behavior of M can be represented as a sequence of transitions such as ͑RtT 1 , RtT 2 , . . .͒. The effective execution of M is the sequence of transitions RtT i such that each two successive states are different (i.e., @i, RtT i .RsT from RtT i .RsT to ). That is, it does not include execution fragments looping around the same state, and only contains those transitions that can make the JFSM change its state.
JFSMs for Known OSPF Attacks
To detect all the attacks mentioned in Section 3, three JFSMs were designed for different attacks: the seqϩϩ attack in Figure 10 , the maxage attack in Figure 12 , and the maxseq attack in Figure 13 . The definitions of the events are shown in Table II . Contents of the configuration file for these JFSMs can be found in Appendix A.2.
As an example, a JFSM to detect the Seqϩϩ attack is depicted in Figures  10 and 11 . In this example, JiNao is running on the originator of the monitored LSAs. If the JFSM receives alternate incoming and outgoing LSAs with increasing sequence numbers two times, it will raise an alarm. The "o_SeqIncr" event by the outgoing LSA from the originator is intended to "fight back" the previous malicious one.
Lines 1-2 in Figure 11 describe two transitions for the initial state. Line 1, specifically, describes that, if the new incoming LSA sequence number is bigger than that of the previous outgoing LSA (with the same LSAid), then an i_SeqIncr event will trigger the transition and the JFSM will then move to State 1. In the attack scenario, this transition represents the fact that the LSA's originator has received its own LSA instance with an abnormal sequence number-normally the sequence number should be the same as or less than the one it just sent out.
However, this unusual event by itself is not enough to raise a red flag for the Seqϩϩ attack. In OSPF, if a router crashes, its LSA instances will still be kept by other routers for about 30 minutes (i.e., 1800 seconds). Therefore, when this router restarts within the 30 minute limit, it can still receive "old" LSA instances with a bigger sequence number. In such a case, the LSA's originator will issue another LSA with an even bigger LSA to "clean-up" the old copies. Line 3 represents this "clean-up" or "fight back" scenario. It is an o_SeqIncr event, since the originator will increment the LSA by at least one. Please note that at this state, the originator could receive more than one i_SeqIncr before the o_SeqIncr is out. The rationale is that, if the originator has more than one neighbor, it could receive more than one copy of i_SeqIncr. However, after the o_SeqIncr is out, the current outgoing LSA is updated. It is impossible for an old copy of 
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• the LSA instance to raise another i_SeqIncr, since the most recent outgoing sequence number has been updated. Finally, if the originator itself has crashed, then it will not "fight back" within the 30 minute limit. Therefore, it will trigger the Line 4 transition and go back to the initial state. Line 5 represents that other possible input events will let the JFSM stay at the current state 1. Lines 6-9 in Figure 11 describe whether this originator will receive another unusual i_SeqIncr from one of its neighbors after it delivered an o_SeqIncr. If this is indeed a Seqϩϩ attack, the attacker will keep increasing the sequence number, and so, as shown in Line 6, we will receive another i_SeqIncr within 30 minutes. The transition in Line 10 is critical, since after another fight back from the originator is observed, the JFSM will raise a red alarm about the Seqϩϩ attack to the decision module.
In the Maxage attack shown in Figure 12 , the JFSM starts from initial state Init_0. If the JPAM receives an incoming or outgoing (originated) LSA with the same sequence number as the previous outgoing LSA, it will be considered as the start of a suspicious premature process for the current LSA. The JFSM will first advance itself to state 1, then, within 30 minutes, the JFSM should receive an outgoing LSA update with a bigger sequence number than the previous one (usually increased by one) to "fight back" the last LSA and advance to state 2. From state 2, if it receives another incoming Maxage event within 10 minutes, it will advance to an "alarm state," send an alarm message to a local decision module, and immediately reset to the initial state in order to monitor the next Maxage attack pattern. In order to differentiate real premature aging and attack, we 
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• define a threshold of two Maxage events. The JFSM can be adjusted to a level of sensitivity that eliminates all false alarms by similar concepts.
In the Maxseq attack in Figure 13 , the JFSM differentiates good or bad implementations with two patterns: {MaxSeq, MaxAgeMaxSeq, initSeq, Update} and {MaxSeq, initSeq}. If an OSPF router is good, then, when it receives an incoming LSA with a maximum sequence number, it should issue an outgoing LSA with a maximum age and a maximum sequence number to purge the previous LSA first, and then issue an LSA with an initial (minimal) sequence number. After that, the normal update LSAs will occur every 30 minutes. If the OSPF router has a wrong implementation, then, when it receives an incoming LSA with a maximum sequence number, it will directly issue an LSA with an initial sequence number without purging the previous one, and cause an infinite fight-back cycle. Once this situation is detected, the JFSM will report to the local decision module to react to this attack by wrapping it with a JiNao wrapper, which is a mechanism to help the router by issuing an extra Maxage LSA for purging.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have developed an JFSM generator and a general JFSM object class that is dynamically configurable and can produce any JFSM by setting the transition table in the JFSM configuration file. As shown in Appendix 1.1, transition functions are represented as a transition table in that file. The JFSM's running state is advanced by the table lookup mechanism. Each state is associated with several transitions. Since the JPAM is configurable, the configuration files need to be constructed first, and then the JPAM will execute online. This section explains in more detail the formats of two kinds of configuration files-one for the JPAM and one for the JFSM. The first three fields specify the LSA object that needs to be monitored. As mentioned in Section 2, an LSA can be uniquely identified by these three fields. The fourth field decides whether to consider "outgoing" LSAs or not. Although JiNao can observe all the LSAs generated by all the routers in the same AS (due to flooding), it can only detect the outgoing LSA that its own router originated. The differentiation of "incoming" and "outgoing" may change the construct of the JFSMs later. The fifth field specified the name of the log file. Note that if the file name is NULL, then the JPAM will not create a log file. That is, it only processes the events of this LSA online, JFSM configuration file. Each JFSM is a timed nondeterministic automata, which can be constructed using the following file format. ϽFSMnameϾ will automatically be prefixed with the EvtAbs ID string that uniquely identifies the JFSM that reports the detection results to the local decision module when it detects attack. The string ϽInfoStringϾ represents the report information when it detects a positive alarm. If ϽResultOutputFileϾ is not equal to NULL, it will output the result to this file, as well as to the standard output device, to provide postexecution information. ϽtheSizeKeepInLogQueueϾ is a number that indicates the maximum size for each log event sequence. Generally, it is impossible to record everything in memory. A queue will always keep the last several events up to the size of queue. In order to detect a known attack pattern, the queue size must at least be larger than the size of this attack pattern.
After "Transitions" each line specifies ten fields, and the fields are separated by white space. These ten fields represent one transition of thie finite state machine. JFSM can have as many transitions as it needs, and each transition is provided as one line in this format.
The first four fields represent the transition of a conventional FSM model. The fifth to tenth fields represent the lower and upper bounds for three timers, as mentioned before. In the JFSM model, all input events and states are associated with timestamps. The implementation complies with the definitions discussed in Section 5.1
Three timer values were added to the JFSM State class: InTime, lastTime, and OutTime. InTime is the time for the transition to first advance the JFSM into the current state; lastTime is the time for the very last transition in the current state. OutTime is the time for the JFSM to step out of the state. So the total time the JFSM stays in the state is ͑OutTime Ϫ InTime͒. That is, InTime is equal to the event time at which the JFSM gets into this state, and OutTime is equal to the event time at which the JFSM exits this state. There is a global variable currentTime of the JFSM to record the current event time. When the JFSM transitions stay in the current state, ͑currentTime Ϫ InTime͒ is the time the JFSM has spent at the current state so far. ͑currentTime Ϫ InitialState.lastTime͒ is the time elapsed from the initial state. It can be used to specify the time requirement for a successful attack pattern.
For example (as shown in Figures 14 and 15 ), state_2 is a dead state (in which JFSM will stay forever unless it is stopped by force) for JFSM transitions. From initial state 0, regardless of the input, the JFSM always goes to state 1. While in state 1, if "b" arrives and occurs within 3 seconds (too soon) of the previous event, the JFSM will stay in state 1 again and update the lastTime as b's evtTime, but InTime will still remain unchanged. In state 1, if "a" occurs within 1 second (too soon), then the JFSM will transition to state 3. In state 1, if "a" occurs after 5 seconds (too late), it will transition to state 2. After entry into state 2, it will ignore any input 
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• thereafter and stay in state 2 until the JFSM stops. The sixth transition is to prevent the JFSM from waiting for "a" forever.
Testbed and Experimental Results
The testbed for our demonstration in the Air Force Base laboratory is shown in Figure 16 . Machines are referred to as R1, R2, R3, Middle, Cisco, and R6. R1 is our victim router, and R2 is the attacker. Before launching any attack, we ran a trace route from R3 to Cisco, and observed that the traffic path is {R3, R1, Middle, Cisco}. Attacks not only changed the fields of the sequence number, the age, and the checksum in LSA, but also changed the cost metrics. After we launched an attack from R2 to R1 with LSA (172.16.121.1 172.16.121.1 1), the path was changed to {R3, R2, Middle, Cisco}. That is, after the attack, R2 could get the traffic it could not get before the attack. Because the attacks were persistent, the JPAM could catch them right after the second attack LSA arrived and report the situation to the decision module for reaction. After detecting a malicious MaxSeq attack, the JPAM sent a message to the prevention module that performed a correct purge action to remove the effects of the MaxSeq attack. Results show that all the known attacks were detected correctly. JPAM was 100% accurate in the demonstration. JiNao can even be triggered to start monitoring traffic after the attacks have taken place, and to detect them right after the next attack pattern occurs. As long as the attack is persistent, JPAM can detect it no later than the second occurrence. Since OSPF's self-stabilization property requires that attacks be persistent, this approach becomes much more effective.
CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND FUTURE WORK
This article presented the approach taken in the JiNao project for the design and implementation of the protocol analysis module for detecting attacks to the OSPF routing protocol. We proposed a framework for real-time protocol-based intrusion detection, which could be extended to other network protocols with real-time properties. To enhance the reusability of JPAM/JFSM for other protocols, our design and implementation is object-oriented and modularized.
Distributed network routing protocols typically need to deal with asynchronous time-related events. In such an environment, it is not surprising that the follow semantics with intervening events is difficult to conduct with a conventional finite state machine model. Hence, an event abstractor (EvtAbs), to catch the important abstract events according to the target protocol specification (in our example, OSPF), and an extended timed automata, the JiNao finite state machine (JFSM), were developed to handle timed events and time constraints such as alarms (for events that happen too soon) and deadlines (for events that happen too late) according to the local clock. With such an extension, it is possible to analyze the timerelated behavior of routing protocols and determine whether intrusions occur from a single observation point (i.e., a router) in the network topology.
From our analysis and experimental results, the model formalized above is effective in terms of the false alarm rate and response latency. We have tested our implementation against event streams collected at both the MCNC and NCSU routing testbeds. We also presented the demonstration for DARPA at the Air Force Base laboratory. Both normal event sequences and three attacks were tested. The JPAM module can successfully detect all three significant attacks and can be extended to other attack scenarios.
From our experience in developing the JFSMs to detect intrusions, we learned that an effective event engine is one of the keys in the success of the JPAM. In the future, we would like to extend our approach to a "universal event abstractor" which can be configurable to any protocol by only several configuration files. For example, protocol headers can be described in the file, and predefined events can be put on the file as well as in a special language, such that this universal event abstractor with a suitable protocol packet parser can generate any event needed for various network protocols.
The following is a summary of the advantages of the real-time protocol analysis approach for intrusion detection:
Real-Time Protocol Analysis • (1) it is best for known attacks;
(2) catches unknown attacks if the expected good behavior is specified in JFSMs;
(3) catches real-time hit-and-run attacks;
(4) reflects the real-time network events quickly;
(5) monitors routers' behavior closely;
(6) verifies implementations of the protocol;
(7) identifies the weakness of the protocol.
One limitation of our results here is that there are not many routing attacks available today. Hence we cannot formally and quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of the various JFSM modules for a particular network protocol. To address this limitation, we are in the process of formalizing an attacker's model for the link-state routing protocols. Our goal is to develop a comprehensive set of attacks and to prove that this set actually covers everything that an attacker can do to hurt our system. Therefore, we can rigorously show the effectiveness of our JPAM/JFSM module in detecting all intrusions against the target protocols. 
